



I. THE SPECIAL INTEREST REGULATORY WELFARE STATE
James Madison identified domination by economic and ideo-
logical factions as the central problem in a liberal polity. He ar-
gued that such domination was more likely to occur in smaller, ter-
ritorially limited units of government than in the proposed
national government. An extended republic would encompass so
many diverse and scattered factions that no single interest group
could gain dominance, nor could permanent coalitions be main-
tained. Liberated from servitude to faction, federal officials would
forswear parochial and partisan loyalties and adopt measures for
the common good.1 The separation of powers within the national
government would provide an additional safeguard against domi-
nation by factions while preventing the growth of excessive and
irresponsible central power.2 The form of national political integra-
tion achieved through the new Constitution's legal structure would
thus ensure government in the public interest.
Economic integration and development would accompany po-
litical integration, aided by federally guaranteed free movement of
labor, goods, and capital within a multi-state economy. Furthering
Madison's vision, the federal courts during the nineteenth century
provided security for interstate contracts and investments, en-
t Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Depart-
ment of Justice or the United States. The assistance of Jonathan Wiener in the preparation
of this article is gratefully acknowledged.
' See Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77, 77-78
(New Am Lib, 1961).
2 See Federalist 51 (Madison) in id at 320, 323-35.
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couraged the growth of multi-state business corporations, curbed
state protectionism, and fostered the development of a common
commercial law. These measures, together with Congress's creation
of a national currency and its investment, along with the states, in
a transportation infrastructure, promoted economic growth and
the rise of regional and national markets. Other aspects of eco-
nomic policy and virtually the entire field of social life were left to
the states and localities. With the striking exception of slavery,
events throughout the nineteenth century amply justified
Madison's optimism.
By the end of the nineteenth century economic growth had
resulted in full-scale industrialization and spawned giant multi-
state business corporations.3 These developments generated de-
mands for political control of the new leviathans-demands as-
serted not only by consumers and workers but also by business, as
small businesses sought protection against the competition of large
enterprises, and the large enterprises sought governmental
measures to stabilize the vicissitudes of the market. The courts
could not or would not provide such protection. Private adjudica-
tion was inherently ill-suited to addressing the collective conse-
quences of industrialization. Moreover, most judges were firmly
committed to market competition as the preferred mode for or-
ganizing economic activity. Legislatures responded more favorably
to these demands, but generally rejected government ownership of
industrial enterprises as a solution. Instead, they chose regulation.
Originally the states performed the bulk of the regulation, but
eventually the national government stepped in as decentralized
regulation in a federal system of numerous states proved to be
hampered by several factors. First, the interstate mobility of capi-
tal and commodities, which the federal courts have so zealously
promoted, undermines the willingness of states to impose stringent
controls on business enterprises. States fear that such measures
will handicap their own industries in competition with those of
other states, and also drive business investment elsewhere. Second,
many of the smaller states have far fewer administrative resources
than the corporations that they seek to regulate. Finally, coordina-
tion problems make a system of decentralized state regulations es-
pecially ill-suited for controlling national transportation systems
and product markets. Thus, federal regulation was first enacted in
these areas.
' See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in Ameri-
can Business (Harvard, 1977).
[57:335
Madison's Nightmare
The dominant form of government regulation, whether at the
state or national level, was a "command and control" system im-
plemented by specialized administrative agencies. This system was
first developed in railroad regulation, where price, entry, and ser-
vice controls were used to combat the perceived evils of market
power. It was later extended to such diverse fields as pharmaceuti-
cals, trade practices, and broadcasting.4 Then came the Great De-
pression, a vivid lesson in economic interdependence. Fresh politi-
cal demands arose for ambitious new federal regulatory programs
aimed at stabilizing the national economy. The command and con-
trol system of regulation was extended to labor relations, securi-
ties, agriculture, trucking, aeronautics, and other sectors.
The New Deal also produced the first wave of large-scale na-
tional social insurance and welfare programs, including the social
security and unemployment systems. These and later national so-
cial welfare programs responded to the states' inability to meet the
growing demand for government provision of social services and
assistance. As theorists of fiscal federalism have shown, there are
grave structural impediments to providing such benefits through a
system of decentralized government.5 The interstate mobility of
commodities and capital discourages states from raising taxes to
fund generous social programs because states fear burdening their
own businesses and triggering an exit of wealth. An additional dis-
incentive is the mobility of individuals among states-a mobility
that has been legally guaranteed by the federal courts. States fear
that if they adopt generous social programs, they will attract an
influx of the needy, necessitating further tax increases. On the
other hand, this fear may be overstated, because in practice many
poor, ill, aged, or otherwise needy individuals cannot readily move
and may remain trapped in poorer states or localities that lack the
fiscal resources to adequately provide for them.'
Two basic types of national measures have been enacted by
Congress to deal with these fiscal federalism problems. One con-
sists of the federal government delivering benefits to individuals in
the form of cash (social security retirement and disability pay-
Stephen Breyer, in Regulation and its Reform (Harvard, 1982), analyzes the func-
tional relations between different types of market activity thought to require government
modification, and different types of tools (including command and control measures) that
government might use to regulate such activity.
6 See, for example, Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1972).
See Oates, Fiscal Federalism at 49-53; and Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and
Rights, 19 Ga L Rev 917, 949-50 (1985).
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ments) or near-cash (food stamps and payment of medical ex-
penses). The other consists of federal grants to states and localities
to support various state and local social services (education, hous-
ing, health care services, rehabilitation, transportation) that other-
wise might not be adequately funded because of the factors previ-
ously noted. These grants are generally conditioned on the states
and localities dedicating the funds to specific purposes, supplying
matching funds, and complying with various other requirements.'
When these and similar regulatory and social welfare pro-
grams were challenged on constitutional grounds, the Supreme
Court sustained them, repudiating earlier dual federalism jurispru-
dence that had sought to allocate distinct roles to the state and
federal governments. In doing so, the Court not only had to con-
strue Congress's taxing, spending, and commerce powers very
broadly, but also had to reject claims that these exertions of na-
tional authority violated structural principles of federalism pro-
tecting state autonomy. Moreover, the implementation of these
federal programs required the development of vast and unprece-
dented federal bureaucracies. In sustaining the validity of these
new bureaucratic arrangements, the Court allowed Congress to
delegate broad lawmaking powers to administrative agencies, in-
vest them with adjudicatory powers that would traditionally have
been exercised by courts, and limit the President's power to re-
move and thus control their directors. At the same time, the Court
abandoned constitutional protection for common law economic
rights and liberties. This was the New Deal constitutional revolu-
tion. s In its aftermath, majoritarian politics determined economic
and social policy, creating a system of competitive federalism in
which either the federal government or the states could adopt and
implement such policies.
Increasingly, it was the national government that was best
able to meet rising political demands for economic stabilization,
growth, and economic justice. The courts' relaxation of traditional
separation of powers limitations freed the national government to
meet these demands. Congress created the regulatory and social
welfare programs of the New Deal and Great Society, and estab-
7 Another technique, adopted by Congress in the 1930s to deal with unemployment
compensation, is to impose a federal tax on business but recognize an offsetting credit if a
state imposes a similar tax and uses the proceeds in ways specified by Congress. See Stew-
ard Machine Co. v Davis, 301 US 548 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of Title IX of the
Social Security Act).
8 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale
L J 1013, 1069 (1984).
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lished vast administrative bureaucracies to implement these
programs.
The abandonment by the Supreme Court of dual federalism
and other structural principles of constitutional law was little
mourned.9 Commentators found adequate safeguards for federal-
ism in the political structuring of the Constitution, which provided
for territorially-based representation in Congress and in the presi-
dential electoral college. Also, the national political parties have a
decentralized structure based primarily on states and large cities.
This system was thought to ensure the effective representation of
state and local interests in Congress. Given this composition, Con-
gress would accordingly be sensitive to federalism values and not
enact new national programs unless necessary to meet overriding
national need. 10
Moreover, the several branches of the federal government were
increasingly viewed as more responsive to racial and other minori-
ties than state or local governments. As federal civil rights legisla-
tion extended and enforced the initiatives of the federal courts
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the successes of the civil
rights movement were emulated by advocates for the poor and for
consumer and environmental interests. The advocates asserted
that their constituents were not adequately served either by the
market or by state and local governments. They thus sought ap-
propriate protection from the federal courts and Congress.
In the period 1965-1980, Congress adopted sweeping new envi-
ronmental, health, safety, and antidiscrimination regulatory stat-
utes. There are at present over sixty major federal programs regu-
lating business and non-profit organizations. Congress dramatically
increased funding for direct federal social insurance and assistance
programs, many of which also apply to state and local govern-
ments. Congress also greatly increased federal funding of condi-
tional grant programs to states and localities. They now impose
over one thousand different sets of conditions and requirements on
state and local governments. Nonprofit organizations such as uni-
versities and health care institutions that receive federal grants are
also subject to these conditions. In many cases, these grants regu-
See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va L Rev 1, 21-23 (1950).
Jo See Morton Grodzins, The American System 254-89 (Rand McNally, 1966); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government in Arthur W. MacMahon, ed, Federalism:
Mature and Emergent 97 (Russell & Russell, 1962). This view remains popular today. See
Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 551-52 (1985) (states
should look to Congress, not courts, for protection of their interests).
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late not only the recipients' substantive policies, but their organi-
zational structure, employment practices, and decisionmaking pro-
cedures as well. State and local governments submit to these
requirements because of irresistible pressures from local interest
group constituencies that stand to benefit from the federal funds."
On Madisonian premises, the growth of these federal programs
should be welcomed as an authentic expression of the public inter-
est and an appropriate consequence of the national government's
superior performance in promoting that interest. The Founders,
one could argue, clearly intended for a politics of the national good
to override state and local measures. National regulatory and social
programs can be understood as correctives for state and local neg-
lect fostered by indifference, the local entrenchment of privilege, or
the structural impediments in a federal system to decentralized
regulation and redistribution.
These confident assumptions of latter-day champions of na-
tional control have, however, been badly shaken during the past
decade. It is now widely understood that the processes through
which national measures are adopted and enforced do not always
ensure that assertions of national power serve the general interest.
Instead, they can invite the very domination by faction that
Madison so desired to prevent. This realization has been sharp-
ened by the rise of public choice theory, which applies the method-
ology of economics to political conduct. 2 Public choice theorists
use a more detailed formulation of Madison's faction analysis to
look beyond stated public interest goals and to focus on political
incentives and their interplay with institutional arrangements.
Genuine aspirations for social and economic progress may be sub-
verted by institutional structures that fail to properly reconcile the
incentives of the various decisionmakers.
Several factors explain the vulnerability of national policy to
factional control. First, the strength of traditional territorially-
based political parties has been sapped by the rise of a new politi-
cal system, one based on the national media, mass mailings, and
single issue political contributions. This system is dominated by
nationally-organized economic and ideological interest groups of
single issue rather that majoritarian politics.
", Richard B. Cappalli, 2 Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements § 11:24 at 54-55
(Callaghan, 1982).
12 See, for example, Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Pub-
lic Choice, 65 Tex L Rev 873 (1987); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent (U Mich, 1962).
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Second, federal conditional grant programs, sometimes cele-
brated as a form of "cooperative federalism,"'" are used to co-opt
state and local interest groups and officials. The programs do so by
exploiting such groups' dependency on federal monies to convert
them into supporters of federal measures rather than defenders of
state and local independence.
Third, the dominant reliance on legalistic "command and con-
trol" strategies to achieve national goals inevitably involves a sub-
stantial shift of decisionmaking power from Congress and the Pres-
ident to federal bureaucracies and courts, sidestepping the already
weakened federalism and separation of powers safeguards against
factions.
Command and control regulatory strategies attempt to achieve
national goals by requiring or proscribing specific conduct on the
part of regulated entities, such as the use of specific pollution con-
trol technologies, or the adoption of particular workplace safety
measures. The rapid growth of federal controls has outstripped the
capacity of Congress or the President to responsibly make the
thousands of decisions required to dictate conduct throughout a
vast, diverse, and dynamic nation. Such decisions are either dele-
gated within Congress to subcommittees that are subject to only
weak political accountability, or outside the legislative branch to
federal bureaucracies and courts-whose political accountability is
even weaker.
The exercise of administrative discretion is heavily influenced
by organized economic and ideological interest groups, who offer
political support, threaten political opposition, and deploy legal
remedies to block or delay administrative actions. Since the 1960s,
it has been popular wisdom that regulatory agencies are typically
"captured" by the industries that they are supposed to regulate.
But economic interests beyond the regulated entities have also
played a major role in influencing agency decisionmaking. These
include labor, government contractors, agricultural interests, and
other client groups. In recent years, a variety of new ideological
interest groups, including organizations championing the environ-
ment, consumers, religion, the handicapped, women, abortion
rights, unborn children, and others, have arisen to join the "regula-
tion game."' 4
" See Grodzins, The American System at 25-48 (cited in note 10).
"4 See Bruce M. Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game: Strategic Uses
of the Administrative Process 2-30 (Ballinger, 1978). Various theories of the regulatory pro-
cess are explored in Barry M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation 79-167 (Co-
lumbia, 1980).
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Rather than offsetting each other through mechanisms of
countervailing power, as Madison envisaged, these groups have in-
stead divided power among themselves. This parcelling of power
has been accomplished though congressional delegations of author-
ity to functionally specialized bureaucracies. Each of these new
power centers is dominated by the officials of the agency in ques-
tion and the small number of legislators and private groups inter-
ested in that agency's decisions.
Madison identified the problem of factional domination in ter-
ritorially limited government. The growth of the national regula-
tory welfare state, however, has spawned a new form of factional
domination. By an irony of inversion, Madison's centralizing solu-
tion to the problem of faction has produced Madison's Nightmare:
a faction-ridden maze of fragmented and often irresponsible micro-
politics within the government.' 5 The post-New Deal constitutional
jurisprudence of majoritarian politics has helped produce this re-
sult, because the demands for national regulatory and spending
programs have outstripped the capacity of the national legislative
process to make decisions that are accountable and politically re-
sponsive to the general interest. This has subverted the very prem-
ises of Madisonian politics.
II. ATTEMPTING TO CURE MADISON'S NIGHTMARE THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ENTITLEMENTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
The shortcomings of the new bureaucratic system, at once cen-
tralized and fractionalized, constitute Madison's Nightmare. Af-
fected political constituencies have viewed these shortcomings
from two basic perspectives. The constituencies that were sup-
posed to have benefited from new bureaucratic and regulating pro-
grams-the poor and disadvantaged, environmentalists, consum-
ers, and workers' organizations-have found the benefits delivered
to be far below those promised. The constituencies whose conduct
has been centrally regulated in order to provide these bene-
fits-state and local governments, businesses, and large nonprofit
organizations-believe that their institutional autonomy and free-
dom of initiative have been unduly and arbitrarily curtailed. Both
problems can be traced to the inherent difficulty in attempting to
order a vast and dynamic country through the Federal Register
and the Federal Reports.
11 See Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism 200-06 (Norton, 2d ed 1978).
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The legal commands adopted by central agencies are necessa-
rily crude, dysfunctional in many applications, and rapidly obsoles-
cent. These characteristics, which have received much publicity in
the United States in recent years and helped fuel the political
movement for deregulation, are the inescapable result of centrali-
zation. Bureaucrats in Washington simply cannot gather and pro-
cess the vast amount of information needed to tailor regulations to
the nation's many variations in circumstances and the constant
changes in relevant conditions. In order to reduce decisionmaking
costs, national officials adopt uniform regulations that are inevita-
bly procrustean in application."6 The same problems that have
plagued the Soviet effort at central management of the economy
hamper American efforts to plan selected aspects of the economy
through centralized regulations.
These dysfunctions not only overburden the regulated entities
but also cause them to fail at their intended goals. Legal blueprints
drafted in Washington inevitably fall short of their postulated out-
comes and produce unintended side effects when officials attempt
to apply them to unforseen or changed conditions. The problem of
"implementation gaps" is exacerbated by the dependence of the
federal government on the states to enforce federal regulations.
This enforcement problem is vast.17
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to
preempt the growth of the centralized regulatory welfare state.
During the 1980s, attacks on the system's shortcomings became
politically popular. The Reagan administration even attacked its
constitutional underpinnings, which had remained virtually un-
changed and unchallenged since their New Deal foundation. With
a few wavering exceptions, however, the Court refused to recon-
sider key, long-established rulings that had construed Congress's
commerce and spending powers in sweeping terms, unconstrained
See Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going By the Book (Temple, 1981).
17 There are over 200,000 industrial sources of air pollution, 200,000 sources of water
pollution, and over one million generators of hazardous wastes subject to national regula-
tion. Since states and municipalities have already established regulatory authority in these
areas and are thus well-equipped to monitor and enforce, national programs related to the
environment and many other fields rely heavily on state implementation and enforcement.
Such reliance is also inherent in the conditional grant programs. States, however, are reluc-
tant, for reasons already noted, to enforce national regulations against their own industries
or raise taxes in order to comply with costly federal grant conditions. See page 3 above. In
order to prevent state backsliding, federal officials have resorted to court actions and other
coercive measures to command compliance. This coercion directly short-circuits state and
local political processes.
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by federalism concerns. 8 The Court meanwhile abandoned re-
ceived separation of powers understandings in order to allow Con-
gress to delegate its own lawmaking authority to administrative
bureaucracies effectively insulated from political control. At the
same time and fueled in important part by powerful civil rights
concerns, state and local governments were induced by conditioned
grants of funds or directly coerced by federal regulators to imple-
ment federal programs and to conform their own programs to fed-
eral standards. The task of controlling these new federal powers
was largely assumed by the federal courts, which developed new
subconstitutional principles of administrative law to replace the
now waning separation of powers jurisprudence that had previ-
ously limited the scope of the national government.
Administrative agencies in the United States have long been
required to follow adjudicatory hearing procedures in making deci-
sions, and their decisions have been subject to judicial review. But
review was traditionally afforded only to regulated actors subject
to coercive orders. Beginning in the late 1960s, the federal courts
created new remedies for the beneficiaries of social programs by
recognizing individual claims to benefits as entitlements protected
by procedural due process. Following Charles Reich's logic,' courts
held that benefits analogous to traditional common law property
rights-including social insurance, assistance payments, housing,
and employment-could not be withheld by the government with-
out affording the affected individual an administrative hearing and
judicial review. This stratagem was, however, of limited reach be-
cause of the government's need to readjust the content of most
broad benefits in light of changing economic and social conditions.
18 The Court had decades earlier established Congress' broad authority under the
spending power, see, for example, Helvering v Davis, 301 US 619 (1937) (upholding old age
benefits); and Steward Machine Co. v Davis, 301 US 548 (upholding unemployment com-
pensation), and the commerce clause, see, for example, Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111
(1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act); United States v Darby, 312 US 100
(1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301
US 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act); and West Coast Hotel v Parrish,
300 US 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage and maximum hour rules). The Rehnquist
Court's general refusal to depart from these precedents is illustrated in its reversal of field
from National League of Cities to Garcia, discussed in the text at notes 30-32, and in, for
example, South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (upholding federal law conditioning state
receipt of federal highway funds on state passage of 21-year-old minimum drinking age);
Hodel v Virginia Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 US 264 (majority), 307 (Rehnquist con-
curring in the judgment) (1981) (upholding Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation
Act under, among other things, commerce powers).
19 In Charles A. Reich, The New Property 73 Yale L J 733 (1964).
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The federal courts accordingly developed other remedies for
the beneficiaries of collective benefits such as a cleaner environ-
ment, safer workplaces and products, or a better-informed con-
sumer market. Reacting to the emerging perception of "capture" of
regulatory agencies by regulated entities, federal courts in the late
1960s began to extend rights to administrative hearings and judi-
cial review to consumer representatives, environmental and civil
rights groups, and other collective interests affected by agency de-
cisions. The result was a new "interest representation" model of
administrative law in which all affected groups have the right to
participate in agency decisionmaking procedures and obtain judi-
cial review in order to ensure that the agency has adequately con-
sidered their interests. 20 The key developments included greatly
expanded principles of standing to obtain judicial review; a
changed approach to statutory interpretation that recognized le-
gally enforceable agency obligations to protect the interests of pro-
gram beneficiaries; the creation of "paper hearing" rulemaking
procedures that afforded all interested groups an opportunity to
submit data, analyses, and comments to an administrative record
without hobbling the agency process under trial-type adjudicatory
procedures; and the creation of a "hard look" standard of review of
administrative discretion to ensure that an agency's decision ad-
dressed in a reasoned fashion the concerns and contentions of the
interested parties.
The interest representation model attempted to cure
Madison's Nightmare by frankly acknowledging the delegation of
legislative discretion to administrators and creating a judicial fo-
rum in which all interests could participate. The hope was that
decisions in furtherance of the public interest would emerge out of
the judicially-supervised clash of factions.
The new system of administrative law sought to cure "imple-
mentation gaps" by giving new legal remedies to consumer, envi-
ronmental, and other "public interest" groups. In addition to se-
curing review of administrative action or inaction, courts
empowered these groups to enforce federal controls directly
against regulated firms or state and local governments. The protec-
tions of the interest representation process were not, however, lim-
ited to the beneficiaries of federal programs. The heavy reliance on
central mandates to carry out these programs bore heavily on busi-
ness firms, state and local governments, and nonprofit organiza-
20 See Richard B. Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L
Rev 1669, 1760-90 (1975).
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tions. The courts thus also sought to provide relief to those regu-
lated, by requiring agencies to pay greater attention to compliance
burdens and to ameliorate the arbitrary consequences of uniform
rules.
III. THERMIDOR
The attempt to cure Madison's Nightmare through new sys-
tems of administrative law has produced improvements, but may
in the end only succeed in entrenching the nightmare. The "new
property" ideal-to afford individual social program benefits the
same security as traditional property rights-could not be fully
reconciled with the exigencies of bureaucratic administration and
the inevitable limitations on the legal resources available to claim-
ants. The security of traditional property interests lay as much in
market forces as in their legal underpinnings. The administrative
capacities and traditions necessary to equivalent protection of spe-
cial program beneficiaries were and remain sadly underdeveloped.
Formal adjudicative hearings cannot provide a substitute without
creating intolerable delay, cost, and other burdens. Moreover, the
interests affected even by programs that provide individual bene-
fits have a collective character that cannot be reduced to bipolar
adjudication.
The interest representation version of administrative law
frankly recognizes these collective elements. But it puts a premium
on organizational and legal resources, and these resources are un-
evenly distributed. Once the traditional model of adjudication is
abandoned in favor of an interest representation approach, there is
no feasible way to ensure that all affected interests are repre-
sented, or that the litigants truly represent the broader constituen-
cies for which they claim to speak. A combination of bureaucratic
hearings and review by unelected judges is an unlikely process for
selecting and implementing measures in the general interest.
Courts and agencies are buried in lengthy adversary hearings that
often take many years to resolve. Federalism values are severely
undermined because interest groups can circumvent state and local
political processes by bringing federal court actions to force local
officials to carry out national directives. No one bears clear respon-
sibility for decisions. The already severe fragmentation of central
authority is exacerbated by treating each agency decision as an iso-
lated event to be judicially reviewed on the basis of its separate
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evidentiary record. The result is a self-contradictory attempt at
"central planning through litigation."21
The Supreme Court has reacted to the burdens and dysfunc-
tions of Great Society administrative jurisprudence only by prim-
ing its growth; it has failed either to reject the new approach or to
develop any alternative systemic remedy for Madison's Nightmare.
The Court has, however, taken several steps to ameliorate the in-
evitable difficulties of subjecting administrative management to
trial-type adjudicatory procedures in the name of the "new prop-
erty." Thus, it has refused to recognize substantive constitutional
entitlements to social benefits such as assistance payments, educa-
tion, and housing. Rather, it has made clear that Congress and the
states retain political discretion to determine and change the con-
tent of the benefits afforded. The judicial role is limited to ensur-
ing adequate procedural guarantees for whatever advantages the
political authorities choose to provide, regardless of claimants'
needs or their expectations of entitlement.22 In addition, the proce-
dural protections afforded have in almost all instances been
sharply depreciated from the judicial adjudication model through
use of a cost-benefit calculation that gives considerable weight to
administrators' concerns for managerial efficiency.2 3 Goldberg v
Kelly24 remains an isolated high water mark of a reformist tide
long ebbed.
The Court has also pulled back from full implementation of
the interest representation model for protection of collective inter-
ests. Liberal standing to secure judicial review still prevails, with
only a few trimmings at the margins. But the ability of regulatory
program beneficiaries to mandate affirmative protection by federal
agencies or state authorities has been restricted.2 The Supreme
Court has underscored the broad discretion of agencies to deter-
mine the substantive content of administrative policies," and has
given them a similar discretion in shaping administrative proce-
dures.27 These accommodations to political-managerial interests in
2 See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in
Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis L Rev 655, 655.
22 Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 487 (1970); and Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341, 349-
50 (1976).
23 Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 343-47 (1976); and Heckler v Campbell, 461 US
458, 465-68 (1983).
24 397 US 254 (1970).
21 Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821, 837-38 (1985).
26 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984); and Campbell, 461 US 458.
2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v NRDC, 435 US 519 (1978).
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the context of collective benefits closely resemble the similar ac-
commodation the courts have made in the "new property" context.
The accommodations have often been accompanied, in judicial
opinions and more explicitly in academic commentary, by invoca-
tions of the superiority of political processes for resolving issues of
social and economic policy. These invocations, however, seldom be-
tray real enthusiasm for these political processes. The case for cut-
backs in Great Society administrative jurisprudence rests far more
on discontent with its burdens than on affirmative support for any
particular alternative. The problem of Madison's Nightmare there-
fore persists.
IV. CURING MADISON'S NIGHTMARE
Political and academic discourse identifies three prevailing
cures for Madison's Nightmare: reinvigoration of judicial controls
over the administrative state; structural change to restore political
responsibility; and dissolution of the regulatory welfare state
through deregulation and devolution. This essay briefly considers
each of these alternatives and offers a fourth-reconstitutive law.
A. Reinvigoration of Administrative Law
Many hold that the Supreme Court's retreat from Great Soci-
ety administrative jurisprudence is a mistake, and that reinvigo-
rated judicial supervision of the regulatory welfare state is the best
cure for Madison's Nightmare. Even more liberalized standing,
ready judicial review of administrative discretion, more stringent
procedural requirements, assured access for public advocacy
groups, greater judicial control of agency discretion through statu-
tory construction and other techniques, and more expansive judi-
cial remedies (especially against state and local government), are
affirmed as the solution to the ills of the centralized regulatory
welfare state.
The author himself has joined parts of this chorus, believing
that the Supreme Court has sometimes spoken in too sweeping
terms and that a more finely-tailored adjustment of judicial con-
trols was preferable. 2s But refurbishing judicial innovations of the
late 1960s is not a sufficient remedy for Madison's Nightmare in
the 1990s. These remedies respond more to the symptoms of the
28 Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Proce-
dure, 91 Harv L Rev 1805, 1821 (1978); and Richard B. Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Pub-
lic Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv L Rev 1193, 1305-07 (1982).
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problem than its underlying roots. They may nonetheless be
worthwhile, even if costly and burdensome; contemporary adminis-
trative law does afford greater access and accountability than
would otherwise be available. But administrative law alone is not a
sufficient response, as its most knowledgeable advocates recog-
nize.29 Moreover, the current and likely future federal judiciary has
little enthusiasm for it.
B. Constitutional Fundamentalism
Critics of the national regulatory welfare state have sought to
shake its jurisprudential foundation by advocating judicial revival
of traditional structural principles of constitutional law. The fed-
eral courts were, for example, urged to revive a form of dual feder-
alism by reserving certain functions or fields to the states and lim-
iting the powers of the federal government in order to protect state
and local independence. The Supreme Court attempted such a re-
vival in its 1976 decision, National League of Cities v Usery,30 in-
validating as an unconstitutional invasion of state autonomy the
application of national minimum wage laws (adopted by Congress
in an exercise of its commerce power) to municipal employees.
This decision, however, bore little fruit and in 1985 the Court over-
ruled it. 31 Proposals to revive the constitutional principles prohib-
iting delegation of legislative power to agencies, and limiting the
transfer of adjudicatory responsibilities from courts to federal
agencies, have similarly been unavailing.32
The problem seems to be that a full-fledged revival of tradi-
tional structural principles would impose serious limits on federal
governmental powers and plunge the courts into acute and perilous
political controversy. On the other hand, more modest efforts to
use constitutional adjudication to limit federal power at the mar-
gins, as exemplified by National League of Cities, inevitably seem
arbitrary.
Similarly, any judicial effort to reserve certain functions or
fields of policy to the states runs up against the need for national
29 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421, 485-
91 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev
405, 505 (1989); Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law (Yale, 1990).
30 426 US 833 (1976).
3' Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985).
" Such proposals are reflected in, for example, Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Indus-
trial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 671 (1980) (concurring in
the judgment), and American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan, 452 US 490, 543
(1981) (dissenting).
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measures to deal with the far-reaching consequences of integration
in a federal system (at least one comprising fifty states)"3 and the
impossibility of principled, a priori line-drawing. Alternatively, the
judges could prohibit the national government from using certain
policy instruments, such as conditions on federal grants to state
and local governments, that are especially destructive of federalism
values. But such instruments may sometimes be necessary to
achieve common goals. And if such measures were prohibited, Con-
gress could devise alternatives (such as total federal preemption)
that are equally or perhaps even more destructive. Finally, case-
by-case judicial balancing of national and state interests leaves ma-
jor national programs prey to subjective, shifting assessments by
unelected judges. The court's overruling of National League of
Cities reflects its unwillingness to venture these hazards.
Another possible constitutional cure for Madison's Nightmare
is invalidation of broad congressional delegations of regulatory au-
thority to federal administrative agencies. 4 Advocates claim that
forcing Congress to make detailed policy choices would restore po-
litical accountability, reinvigorate the political safeguard of feder-
alism, and ensure more responsible decisions in the general inter-
est. But such a step would also amount to a constitutional
counterrevolution. The Supreme Court has only twice invalidated
national statutes as unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power.35 These decisions, rendered early in the New Deal period,
were soon abandoned. The Court concluded that it should not,
save in the most extreme and improbable circumstances, second-
guess congressional decisions that broad delegations are necessary
and proper means of realizing regulatory and welfare goals.36 Res-
urrecting the doctrine against delegation of legislative powers
would force the courts to make essentially subjective and standard-
less judgments about which delegations are constitutionally per-
Experience in Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany suggests that in a fed-
eral system that has a smaller number of states and constitutionally derived reservations to
the states of power in specific fields , the states may be able to agree on common measures
to deal effectively with the effects of economic integration. For example, in Germany broad-
cast regulation is the responsibility of the Ldnder, but a largely unified system of govern-
mental policy has nonetheless emerged.
- This remedy is advocated in Lowi, The End of Liberalism at 128-56 (cited in note
15), which documents the rise of factional micropolitics within the national regulatory wel-
fare state.
11 See Panama Refining Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388 (1935); and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v United States, 295 US 495 (1935).
36 See Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy 68-95 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1985).
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missible and which are not. Similar difficulties would attend judi-
cial efforts to impose strict limits on Congress's transfer of
adjudicatory authority from courts to agencies.
Even if the courts did enforce the non-delegation doctrine rig-
orously and in doing so invalidated many current federal programs,
it seems likely that Congress would react by passing the writing of
detailed measures on to its own legislative subcommittees. Experi-
ence with Congress's use of the legislative veto of agency regula-
tions suggests the hazards inherent in this approach.3 7 Subcommit-
tees are subject to the same interest group influences as
administrative agencies. Moreover, the safeguards of public hear-
ings and judicial review that apply to federal administrative agen-
cies do not apply to Congress or its subcommittees. Increased in-
ternal delegations by Congress could well have the effect not of
ending but of prolonging Madison's Nightmare.
Some changes in structural jurisprudence may nonetheless be
justified as enhancing political responsibility and accountability.
For example, the Supreme Court's decisions in INS v Chadha38
and Bowsher v Synar 9 have properly restrained Congress's efforts
to exercise ongoing controls over powers delegated to the executive.
In addition, the freedom of the President and his staff to deliber-
ate with and advise administrative officials deserves firmer elabora-
tion and protection. Finally, the issues of campaign financing and
incumbent entrenchment require systematic examination in con-
cert with more traditional discussions of the legal foundation of
national governance and politics. But such measures alone will not
cure Madison's Nightmare.
C. Deregulation and Devolution
The Reagan administration's New Federalism program pro-
posed that much of the national regulatory welfare state be dis-
mantled through a combination of deregulation and devolution of
responsibilities to state and local governments. Many forms of eco-
nomic regulation are indeed unjustified. Greater reliance on mar-
ket competition in many areas will enhance consumer welfare.40
Much of the deregulation accomplished in the United States in re-
cent years in fields such as energy, transportation, communica-
3 See Harold H. Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv L Rev 1369, 1433-37 (1977).
31 462 US 919 (1983).
31 478 US 714 (1986).
'0 See Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform ch 8 (cited in note 4).
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tions, and financial services has been a success. But markets alone
cannot be relied upon to resolve many of the environmental,
health, safety, and consumer problems created by industrialization
and mass marketing. Moreover, state and local governments can-
not deal effectively with these problems of market failure in the
face of economically integrated national markets, product and cap-
ital mobility, and the rise of large multi-state businesses. Similarly,
the mobility of commodities, capital, and people, as well as dispari-
ties in resources, prevents states and localities from adequately
meeting social welfare needs. National measures are thus required
to deal with the problems generated by a national economy.
D. Reconstitutive Law
The most promising solution to Madison's Nightmare is not
indiscriminate devolution and deregulation. Neither is it a consti-
tutional counterrevolution by the courts, nor stiffer judicial con-
trols on administrators through administrative law. The best solu-
tion is to adopt new strategies for achieving national goals in lieu
of the centralizing command and control techniques relied upon so
heavily in recent decades.
The ultimate goal of national measures is to ensure that deci-
sions by state and local governments, individuals, businesses, and
nonprofit organizations promote national norms and goals. Com-
mand and control regulation attempts to achieve such harmoniza-
tion by dictating the precise outcome of specific decisions within
these various institutional systems. Rather than dictating conduct
within other institutions, the national government can instead use
more indirect methods to achieve "strategic coupling" of the insti-
tutions' decisions with national norms and goals.41 The laws gov-
erning these institutions can be reconstituted in order to steer the
overall tendency of institutions' decisions in the desired direction
'vithout attempting to dictate particular outcomes in every situa-
tion. Reconstitutive law can in many areas replace command law
as a means of promoting national goals.42 For example, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act transformed the structure of decision-
making in labor relations from a model of private employer-em-
ployee contract to one of collective bargaining, reconstituting the
labor market to emphasize the collective and inframarginal voice of
"' The concept of "strategic coupling" is developed in Gunther Teubner, After Legal
Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law, 12 Intl J Soc L 375 (1984).
42 The notion of "reconstitutive law" is explained in Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive
Law, 46 Md L Rev 86 (1986).
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workers, and collective decisions by employers, rather than relying
on the signals given by marginal worker mobility.43 The "bubble"
and other emissions trading innovations adopted by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency allowed regulatory permissions to be
bought and sold, creating a new form of market property and a
reconstituted market.44 Antitrust law reconstituted the terms of
market competition. A related form of reconstitution is to substi-
tute one form of regulatory structure for another: during the 1930s
federal legislation adopted for many sectors of the economy a sys-
tem of administrative price, quantity and service controls in lieu of
a system of markets governed by antitrust. In the economic dereg-
ulation movement of the past fifteen years, this process was
reversed.
Many of the social regulatory goals-including environmental,
health, and worker and consumer protection-that have received
priority in recent decades can also be promoted through reconsti-
tutive measures. For example, the elaborate existing system of cen-
tral regulatory controls on air and water pollution in the United
States could be replaced by a system of transferable pollution per-
mits that would simultaneously limit the total amounts of pollu-
tion permitted and allow authorizations to pollute to be freely
bought and sold among polluters. The government would have to
monitor emissions to ensure that no source was polluting in excess
of its permit rights. But the national government would no longer
attempt to dictate through uniform regulations how much each
plant may emit, or what control technologies to employ. The total
costs of pollution control-currently over $60 billion annually in
the United States-would likely be reduced 50 percent or more be-
cause each plant could adopt the most cost-effective control
method available to it, and plants that could control more cheaply
would assume more of the clean-up burden and hold fewer per-
mits. There would be a strong economic incentive for all firms to
pollute less, conserve resources, develop innovative technologies,
and sell excess permits. States or regional authorities could be
"I See, for example, Richard Freeman and James Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (Basic
Books, 1984); Paul Weiler, Governing the Workplace (Harvard, forthcoming 1990).
11 See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environ-
mental Law, 37 Stan L Rev 1333 (1985); Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Marketa-
ble Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 Ecol L Q 361 (1989); James T.B. Tripp
and Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable
Rights Programs, 6 Yale J Reg 369 (1989); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Emis-
sions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed Reg 43814 (1986).
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given a major role in the initial allocation of permits and the sub-
sequent management of the pollution permits market.4 5
In other areas of regulation, different reconstitutive strategies
could be used. For example, the current reliance on central admin-
istrative commands to promote occupational health and safety in
the United States could be significantly reduced if measures were
taken to promote greater efforts by employers and employees to
address health and safety problems. Such measures could include
disclosure of information about workplace hazards, joint employer-
employee selection of occupational hazard officers, and steps to
promote resolution of health and safety issues through collective
bargaining. This approach would substitute flexibility and innova-
tion for the current system of rigid and relatively ineffective cen-
tral commands.46
The problem of ensuring adequate provisions of social services
to the needy by states and localities could be resolved by adopting
a general system of horizontal income transfers among states and
localities in place of the existing overgrown and fragmented system
of federal conditional rights. The federal tax system would be used
to transfer resources from states with strong revenue bases or few
needy persons to states and localities with few revenue bases and
many needy persons. States and localities receiving these transfers
would enjoy wide discretion on how the monies would be spent.
Such a system would reduce disparities among states and localities
in the resources available to meet social needs. It would also help
avoid the frustrating combination of exiting wealth and entering
needy individuals that threatens state efforts to increase benefits
through higher taxes.4 7
Wider adoption of such reconstitutive strategies would go far
towards curing Madison's Nightmare. Renunciation of efforts to
centrally mandate the decisions of states, localities, businesses, and
nonprofit organizations would promote federalism values by restor-
ing decisionmaking responsibility and flexibility to these institu-
tions. The operational overload imposed on all branches of the fed-
eral government by the current command and control strategy
would be greatly eased. The national government would focus on
the general plan of reconstitution, foregoing detailed central plan-
ning of social and economic life.
4' See Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev at 1355-59 (cited in note 44).
" See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice 156-62 (Harvard, 1983).
4 See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga L Rev 917, 975-79 (1985) for
further development of this proposal.
[57:335
Madison's Nightmare
Eliminating central overload would also help restore political
responsibility to the center. The main goals and measures of recon-
stitution could be debated and resolved by Congress and the Presi-
dent, reducing the delegation of vast decisionmaking responsibility
to unelected bureaucrats and judges. The political safeguards of
federalism and separation of powers principles would both be rein-
vigorated. And the current system of faction dominated, legal-
bureaucratic micropolitics would be gradually transformed into
one closer to Madison's vision of a politics of the national good.
Such change cannot be accomplished through constitutional
adjudication by judges. In an integrated federal system of many
states, it is not possible to achieve social and economic justice, re-
store federalism values, and promote a more responsible politics of
the national good by simply cutting back on the role of the central
government and reintroducing other structural limitations on na-
tional authority. What is needed is not a reduction in national au-
thority, but its affirmative exercise in new ways. What is needed is
not judicial limitations on national authority, but the replacement
of command law with reconstitutive law. The courts are powerless
to dictate such a change to Congress and the President. This
change can only be accomplished through political initiatives.
What reason is there to expect that a new politics, one more
favorable to reconstitutive strategies, will arise? It can hardly be
expected that the factions that have entrenched themselves in the
congressional and bureaucratic subsystems of centralized power
will lightly yield place. Current conditions, however, seem
favorable to the emergence of a new politics. The public has not
abandoned its aversion to centralized controls-an aversion that
propelled Ronald Reagan into the White House. The deregulatory
and decentralizing initiatives of the Reagan presidency were a nec-
essary and salutary check on the growth of Madison's Nightmare.
Those initiatives that have succeeded enjoy continued support and
are unlikely to be reversed to any great extent. But at the same
time, the public is committed to national goals of social and eco-
nomic justice, public health and safety, and the protection of the
environment. Reconstitutive strategies can respond to these public
sentiments and create a third course between indiscriminate dereg-
ulation and devolution on the one hand, and attempted govern-
ment by central decree on the other.
Moreover, there are two powerful external constraints that will
force the United States to develop less cumbersome, more cost-ef-
fective alternatives to the dominant command and control form of
regulation. The first is the political constraint on increased federal
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spending. The current system of command regulation, which re-
quires tremendous centralization of information and decisionmak-
ing, is generally far more costly for the government to administer
than alternatives that place greater reliance on market incentives.
In addition, command and control regulation typically gives away
valuable public resources and privileges for free, including use of
the air and water to emit industrial residuals, radio and television
frequencies, and airport landing slots. Regulatory programs that
use market-based approaches are far more likely to generate ap-
propriate revenues for the government.4"
The second invigorating constraint is international competi-
tiveness. The command and control approach penalizes investment
and innovation because of high compliance costs, the restrictions
imposed by uniform, inflexible directives, and the delay and uncer-
tainty created by protracted litigation and administrative licensing
and standard-setting proceedings. As it strives to restore the inter-
national vitality of its key industries, the United States can no
longer afford to maintain a regulatory system that puts it at a se-
vere disadvantage in competing with other developed nations.
Greater use of market-based and other reconstitutive strategies
will be needed in order to reduce compliance burdens and en-
courage diversity, flexibility, and innovation on the part of busi-
nesses, consumers, nonprofit organizations, and state and local gov-
ernments. Such strategies will permit the United States to meet
social goals that it deservedly holds important, without compro-
mising the nation's productivity and its economic standing in the
world community.
48 See Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev at 1343-44 (cited in note 44).
